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RECENT DECISIONS 
BANKRUPTCY-PRIORITIES-STATUS OF EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNION 
WELFARE FuNn-Under a collective bargaining agreement an employer was 
required to contribute eight dollars monthly to a union welfare fund for 
each of its employees who were union members. A trust agreement author-
ized the trustees of this fund to file claims of priority in any proceeding 
involving the employer's insolvency. In a bankruptcy proceeding the trustees 
of the fund sought priority as wage claimants for the employer's unpaid 
contributions to the fund which had accrued during the three months 
prior to bankruptcy. In the same proceeding the United States sought 
priority for unpaid taxes. The referee ruled that the unpaid employer 
contributions were not "wages" within section 64a(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Act,1 and relegated the trustee's claim to the status of payments due un-
secured creditors. The district court vacated the referee's order and granted 
wage priority to the employer contributions.2 On appeal, held, affirmed. 
Since employer contributions to union welfare funds are in a realistic sense 
part of the agreed compensation for services rendered, and are also bar-
gained for as an integral part of the wage package, they must be considered 
as "wages" under section 64a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. Matter of Embassy 
Restaurant, (3d Cir. 1958) 254 F. (2d) 475, cert. granted 79 S. Ct. 42 (1958). 
The Bankruptcy Act provides for priority in the payment of certain 
debts, and designates five classes of priority claims, each of which is given 
precedence in payment over succeeding classes. Wages are given second 
priority and government tax claims are fourth.3 Priority under the bank-
ruptcy law was accorded wages long before fringe benefits such as welfare 
plans became common.4 Such fringe benefits have now become an impor-
tant part of the wage structure, and special attention is given to these 
benefits in collective bargaining practices.5 As a result of this increase in 
importance, courts have been faced with the problem of determining 
whether "wages" as used in the priority section of the Bankruptcy Act 
should include fringe benefits. It has been held that vacation pay,6 back 
130 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §104(a). 
2 Matter of Embassy Restaurant, (E.D. Pa. 1957) 154 F. Supp. 141. 
8 "(a} The debts to have priority ••• and the order of payment, shall be • . • (2) 
wages and commissions, not to exceed $600 to each claimant, which have been earned 
within three months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding, due to 
workmen .•• (4) taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States .••• " 
11 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §104(a). 
4 The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was the first to give priority status to "wages." For 
legislative history, see 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., §§64.01, 64.201 (1941; Supp. 1957). 
5 79 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 172, 812 (1956); Bulletin No. 1113, United States Depart-
ment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "'Vages and Related Benefits-40 Labor Markets 
-1951-1952." 
6 ln re Kinney Aluminum, (S.D. Cal. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 565 at 568-569; United States 
v. Monro-Van Helms Co., (5th Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) 10 at 13. 
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pay,7 severance pay8 and disability insurance premiums deducted by the 
employer and paid to an insurance company9 are "wages" under section 
64a(2). Despite this authority for a liberal definition of "wages," the 
federal courts are divided on the question whether employer contributions 
to union welfare funds, one of the most common types of fringe benefits, 
are entitled to priority as "wages . . . due to workmen."10 The courts 
which have denied priority to such unpaid contributions have reasoned 
that "wages . . . due to workmen" in the context of the Bankruptcy Act 
include only direct, present payments to the employee rather than indirect, 
deferred payments.11 It is argued that the legislative intent behind the wage 
priority section was only to provide emergency funds to the employee to 
help him meet his needs during his period of unemployment. Since the 
benefits that the employee derives from a welfare fund do not come directly 
from the employer but are instead administered by the union and are 
contingent on some future retirement or sickness, ·these courts have con-
cluded that contributions to welfare funds were not intended to be given 
priority.12 A broader purpose which today might be assigned to the wage 
priority section, however, is that of insuring economic security for workers 
·rather than merely guaranteeing them an emergency fund.13 If this broader 
purpose is recognized it is not difficult to fit employer contributions to 
a welfare fund into the term "wages."14 No technical definition of this 
7 Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952). 
s McCloskey v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, (9th Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 402. 
9 In re Ross, (N.D. Cal. 1953) 117 F. Supp. 346. 
10 Allowing priority: In re Otto, (S.D. Cal. 1956) 146 F. Supp. 786; In re Schmidt, 
(S.D. Cal. 1953) 33 L.R.R.M. 2283. Denying priority: Local 140 Security Fund v. Hack, 
(2d Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 375, cert. den. 355 U.S. 833 (1957); In re Victory Apparel Mfg. 
Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1957) 154 F. Supp. 819; In re Brassel, (N.D. N.Y. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 827. 
In view of this confusion H.R. 8805 was introduced in the House of Representatives by 
Representative Celler of New York to amend §64a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act to require 
that wage priority be given to union welfare funds. The bill is pending in the House 
Judiciary Committee. 
11 Local 140 Security Fund v. Hack, note 10 supra, at 377-378; In re Brassel, note 
IO supra; In re Victory Apparel Mfg. Corp., note 10 supra. See also Forman, "Priority 
of Union Welfare Funds as Wages in Bankruptcy,". 62 Cor.r. L.J. 321 (1957); note, 42 
MINN. L. R.Ev. 295 (1957); COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., §64.201 at 2083 (1941; Supp. 
1957. 
12 See cases cited in note 11 supra. The fact that the priority claim is limited to $600 
in §64a(2) may be used to support the "emergency fund" argument. 
13 This argument gains added force in light of unemployment compensation benefits 
available on termination of employment. See note, 66 YALE L.J. 449 at 460-461 (1957). See 
also In re Inland Waterways, Inc., (D.C. Minn. 1942) 71 F. Supp. 134; In re Paradise Cater-
ing Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 974; In re Lawsam Electric Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1924) 
300 F. 736; comment, 52 N.W. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 681 (1957). The court in the principal case 
at 476 points out that the achievement of complete economic security for workers is the 
goal of organized labor. 
14 "The term 'wages', as used in this section, has received a very liberal construction." 
In re Roebuck Weather Strip and Wire Screen Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1910) 180 F. 497 at 498. 
See also note, 66 YALE L.J. 449 at 459 (1957). The granting of priority to the welfare fund 
may be to the detriment of the general creditors in some cases. However, the wage earners 
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term is found in the act, and the usual definition of "wages" under section 
64a(2) is "the agreed compensation for services rendered."15 An employer's 
contribution to a welfare fund generally represents another method of 
computing and paying compensation for services rendered.16 The compen-
sation represented by these contributions is present security, a valuable 
and direct benefit to the employee.17 If such an interpretation of the 
term "wages" is adopted, however, a second argument can be made against 
priority status for employer contributions to union welfare funds. This 
argument is to the effect that the "wages" are not "due to workmen" 
in the sense that the employee has no individual or assignable proprietary 
interest in the welfare contribution.18 Yet the language of the statute 
does not expressly require the worker to have an enforceable property 
right in the wages which are due to him.19 The employee may not be able 
to sue the employer directly to enforce his rights in the welfare fund but 
the benefit of the fund is certainly "due" to the employee. The Supreme 
Court in a very recent decision rejected a similar argument made under 
the Miller Act20 that trustees of a welfare fund could not sue as a "person 
who has furnished labor ... for the sums justly due him."21 This decision 
and the union are involved with the employer in such a way that they cannot protect 
themselves from the impending insolvency of the employer, while the general creditors 
are not usually so unavoidably involved with an insolvent. 
15 In re Gurewitz, (2d Cir. 1903) 121 F. 982 at 983; In re New England Thread Co., 
(1st Cir. 1907) 158 F. 788 at 792. The term "wages" as used in other statutes has been 
held to include employer's health and welfare contributions. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 
(7th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 247 at 251, cert. den. 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (Labor-Management 
Relations Act of 1947); MacPherson v. Ewing, (N.D. Cal. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 666 (Social 
Security Act); City of Avalon, (9th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 500 (Federal Employment Tax 
Act). 
16 United States for Benefit and on Behalf of Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 at 217 
(1957); In re Otto, note IO supra, at 789. If a trust agreement specifically provided that 
the welfare contributions were to be "non-wage benefits," should the court still give 
priority to the contributions as "wages"? In other words, should the intent of the parties 
govern or should all welfare contributions of this nature be given wage priority? 
17 The worker is thus given priority in bankruptcy for medical, hospital, surgical, 
and life insurance premiums, rather than cash. In re Otto, note IO supra, at 791. 
18 "Liberality of construction of the term 'wages' does not justify a nullification of 
the language of the statute which grants priority only to 'wages ... due to workmen.' 
The employers' contribution here is never due to the employee." In re Brassel, note IO 
supra, at 830. See also In re Victory Apparel Mfg. Corp., note IO supra. 
10 If the statute did require the employee to have a property right in the fund, various 
theories could be used to find such a right. See note, 66 YALE L.J. 449 at 454, 457 (1957). 
20 49 Stat. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. (1952) §§270a and 270b. 
21 United States for Benefit and on Behalf of Sherman v. Carter, note 16 supra. The 
Court's reply to the contention made was, at 220: "The trustees stand in the shoes of the 
employees and are entitled to enforce their rights .••• [T]hese [welfare] contributions 
are in substance as much 'justly due' to the employees who have earned them as are the 
wages payable directly to them in cash.'' Although the statutory language of the Miller 
Act is broader than that of §64a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, the case does illustrate the 
Supreme Court's attitude in recognizing the union welfare fund as a primary benefit to 
the employee and as part of the compensation for the work done. 
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does not provide a binding precedent for the principal case, but it per-
haps indicates that the Supreme Court is disposed to follow a liberal policy 
with respect to protection of union welfare funds. The holding in the 
principal case represents a non-technical construction of section 64a(2) 
which comports with what today should be regarded as the broad purpose 
of that provision. An affirmance of the principal case by the Supreme 
Court, extending to union welfare funds priority status, would serve to 
buttress current labor activity which has strengthened employee security. 
John W. Simpson 
